The Rise and Pitfalls of Oxycontin ®
Put together a powerful new class of prescription painkillers, a burgeoning
movement to liberalize the use of narcotics for pain, and an aggressive
pharmaceutical marketing campaign, and you have the ingredients of
the public-health disaster described in New York Times reporter Barry
Meier's new book, Pain Killer: A "Wonder" Drug's Trail of Addiction
and Death (Rodale, 2003) which tracks the emergence of Oxycontin ® as
a major drug of abuse in the U.S.
Federal regulators, notably the Drug Enforcement Administration, have long kept
close tabs on Schedule II narcotic drugs, leading many doctors to avoid prescribing
the most powerful painkillers even to terminally ill patients out of fear of
addiction, diversion or -- for themselves -- prosecution. That prompted a backlash
by patients' advocates who, aided by pharmaceutical companies like Purdue Pharma,
began calling loudly for broader use of narcotics for patients with severe and
chronic pain.
As this movement began picking up speed in the mid-1990s, Purdue Pharma introduced
Oxycontin ®, based on the same drug, oxycodone, as familiar medications like
Percocet and Percodan, but at exponentially higher doses and purity. "In terms
of narcotic firepower, Oxycontin ® was a nuclear weapon," writes Meier. But
Oxycontin ® also had a time-released mechanism which the manufacturer claimed
would make the drug less appealing to drug abusers -- a claim that would later
be endorsed by the Food and Drug Administration.
In his book, Meier shows that as early as 1999, Purdue Pharma began receiving
anecdotal reports that addicts were getting around the time-release mechanism
by crushing Oxycontin ® tablets and snorting them to get a potent high from
a drug that is pure oxycodone. Yet the company continued to aggressively market
Oxycontin ® to doctors as less likely to be abused than other narcotic drugs,
as well as expanding the market for Oxycontin ® beyond severe- and chronic-pain
patients for use with a wider range of conditions, including lower-back pain,
arthritis, and pain resulting from sports injuries and trauma.
Meier finds no "black hats" in his examination. But he questions why Purdue Pharma
took so long to take serious steps to address Oxycontin ® abuse.
By 1999 and 2000, rural communities in Virginia and Maine were reporting widespread
abuse of Oxycontin ®. In late 2000, Lee County, Va., physician Art Van Zee
wrote to Purdue Pharma asking the company to stop marketing the drug for nonmalignant
pain and warn doctors about its potential for abuse. Later, Van Zee would call
for Oxycontin ® -- which was bringing in more than $1 billion annually to
Purdue Pharma -- to be pulled off the market altogether.
But Purdue didn't inform doctors about the problems with Oxycontin ® until
mid-2001, and continued to market the drug broadly for treatment of all kinds
of pain. "I think they were understandably reluctant to take the drug off the
market ... nor would I advocate taking it off the market," Meier said in an interview
with Join Together. "But were there steps that Purdue could have taken more quickly
to help prevent this problem from growing in scope and intensity? I think yes."
Still, there's plenty of blame to go around. Meier is highly critical of the
FDA for approving a label for Oxycontin ® (later rescinded) implying that
the drug would be less prone to abuse or diversion than other narcotics. "That
was a major screwup on FDA's part," he says. With its focus on illicit drugs,
DEA was slow to recognize the abuse potential of powerful narcotics like Oxycontin ®.
Unscrupulous or unqualified doctors overprescribed the medication and fed the
illegal market for the drug.
Pain-management advocates also shared responsibility for the problem, Meier said. "They
had labored in the wilderness for so long that they constantly downplayed the
risks," worrying that controversy about Oxycontin ® could hurt their progress
in getting proper pain medication to suffering patients.
"The ultimate tragedy of the Oxycontin ® episode was that it didn't have
to happen; at least not in the way it unfolded," writes Meier in Pain Killer. "But
pain-management advocates, drug-company executives, regulators, and law-enforcement
officials blindly marched forward, venturing ever deeper into one of medicine's
most chaotic realms, the pain industry -- an industry that, much like pain itself,
defies simple definition or description."
Meier's investigation ultimately reveals that Purdue Pharma used questionable
science to back up its claims about the low risk of Oxycontin ® abuse, and
strongly hints that the profit motive may have gotten in the way of sensible
marketing of the product. "It was somewhere around the mid-1990s, as the height
of the pain-management movement and marketing of Oxycontin ® converged, that
the boundary lines between "severe" pain and "moderate" pain, "chronic" pain
and "acute" pain, blurred and became lost," writes Meier. "It is hard to believe,
despite Purdue's arguments to the contrary, that this broadening availability
of Oxycontin ®, a drug classified as the most potentially addicting medication
legally available, along with the minimizing of its abuse potential, did not
play a crucial role in setting the stage for the disaster that followed."
Unlike some other critics, Meier gives Purdue Pharma credit for the campaigns
it has launched in the past few years to educate physicians and others about
Oxycontin ®'s potential for abuse. He praises the company for working with
state officials in Florida and elsewhere to push for comprehensive prescription-monitoring
systems -- initiatives that have been opposed by both doctors' group and other
pharmaceutical companies -- and says reformulating the drug to include naloxone
-- which inhibits the "high" associated with drugs like oxycodone -- could limit
abuse. "What Purdue has done has been, in large part, worthwhile," Meier says.
"There's no evidence that Purdue knew that Oxycontin ® would become the hottest
drug on the street," adds Meier, though he points out, "We still don't know the
real story of what happened inside Purdue, since those documents are not in the
public forum."
Meier is careful not to discount the benefits that Oxycontin ® has had for
patients suffering severe or chronic pain. And he says that some positives have
emerged from the Oxycontin ® debacle, particularly a heightened awareness
of the problem of prescription-drug abuse.
"Whether there are still efforts going on to minimize or trivialize these drugs,
I think there's widespread recognition that changes have to be made, and changes
are being made in how drugs like these are presented to doctors," he told Join
Together. "These drugs do need to get to patients, but they need to be kept only
for the worst-suffering patients."
Source: www.jointogether.org |